Producing multiple forms of value from cultural heritage poses a complex governance challenge. While the existing literature often highlights the importance of enhancing civic participation or strengthening contractual accountability, these approaches have produced limited outcomes. This is partly due to the commons-like characteristics of cultural heritage, which shares key features with common-pool resources: low excludability and high subtractability. These traits tend to exacerbate opportunistic behavior among actors and increase the risk of contractual failure. Coproduction among actors with distinct but complementary capabilities offers an alternative institutional arrangement to address these challenges. However, the conditions under which such arrangements can be effectively sustained remain underexplored.

This article addresses this gap through a case study of the Red House in Taipei. The findings reveal that coproduction was facilitated by a multistakeholder contractual network, which enhanced incentives for collective action and mitigated the risk of defection from shared goals. As a result, the cultural, economic, social, and educational values of heritage can be more effectively generated. This study contributes to theoretical discussions on the commons, principal-agent theory, and coproduction, offering new insights into institutional design for cultural heritage conservation.