Party labels have traditionally been significantly important in elections. However, the recent influence of personalized politics has resulted in the de-labeling of candidates, even in grassroots-level village chief elections. This study explores the impact of (de) labeling on election outcomes, drawing from research on anti-party sentiment, negative partisanship, and the Citizen-Politician linkages theory. By analyzing data from four village chief elections held in Taiwan between 2010 and 2022. Our results reveal that “de-labeled” candidates tend to be non-incumbents in villages with lower population density, education levels, and income. In addition by utilizing Propensity Score Matching and the Two-way Fixed Effects model, our research shows that the de-labeling of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidates generally increases their vote share, while labeling has the opposite effect. Most notably, the (de) labeling of Kuomintang (KMT) candidates does not significantly influence election outcomes, whereas that of DPP candidates does have an impact. This finding may highlight the distinct nature of clientelism linkages prevalent within the KMT, in contrast to the programmatic linkages within the DPP.
Current Issue
Volume #27, Number #2
Published in December, 2023
This study explores how local governments in China maintain a role in policy implementation and influence outcomes despite the central government's greater control under Xi Jinping's leadership. By analyzing the case of a new industrial policy for nurturing “Specialized Refinement, Differential, and Innovation (SRDI)” small giant enterprises, it shows how regions, regarded as competing interest groups, navigate the complex relationship between central and local governments. The research employs Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) and regression methods, utilizing data from 31 Chinese provinces and cities from 2019 to 2022 as observational samples. These data serve as observational samples to assess the impact on the regional distribution of small giant enterprises. The empirical findings highlight the magnitude of a region' s access to SRDI policy resources as being primarily subject to various local advantages, including regional innovation resources, industrial scale and agglomerations, and regional marketization among other factors. This new industrial policy under a fragmented authoritarian regime tends to benefit already advanced regions. Consequently, regions often prioritize their existing industrial strengths. This approach may potentially diverge from the central government' s goals of achieving supply chain autonomy by addressing gaps in the industrial chains.
In 2020, the Chinese government launched the Program of New Infrastructure Construction, an industrial policy aimed at establishing China as a global leader in high-technology manufacturing. Unlike previous industrial policies, this program involved a significant number of private high-technology companies (HTCs). Given that China's economic model is characterized by state capitalism, why has the Chinese industrial policy supported private HTCs? This article examines the Chinese industrial policy regime through the lens of the institutional change approach and argues that the support for private HTCs is rooted in their ability to effectively respond to internal and external impacts on the policy regime. This support has been particularly crucial during the escalating tensions between the United States and China. According to the findings of this study, China's industrial policy regime has begun to undergo a shift. The previous preference for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is gradually loosening, allowing for the introduction of market mechanisms and creating space for private enterprises to participate in the industrial policy regime. However, it is important to note that the authority to selectively support entities through market mechanisms still rests with the Chinese government. Therefore, the industrial policy regime characterized by public-private cooperation as discussed in this article reinforces, rather than weakens, the resilience of China's state capitalism.