The expansion of empires in the nineteenth century accompanied the cross cultural spread of democratic ideals. This article identifies three existing approaches that seek to reconcile Alexis de Tocqueville’s democratic thought with his imperial advocacy, arguing that none has adequately resolved the moral dilemma inherent in his endorsement of empire. Through an analysis of administrative centralization, national honor, and the doctrine of interest rightly understood, this paper elaborates two moral imaginations of the French Empire articulated in Tocqueville’s political thought. The first is a thin moral imagination grounded in liberty. This article justifies local liberty as a legitimate normative standard and demonstrates Tocqueville’s consistent commitment to this principle across his writings on democracy and colonial affairs. The second constitutes a thick moral imagination grounded in interest. It ensures that Tocqueville’s critique of the moral imagination embodied in John Stuart Mill’s benevolent imperial doctrine does not amount to self-criticism. For Tocqueville, empire ought to be a project of self-sacrifice, in which national honor and virtue attain unity through self- sacrifice. By interpreting Tocqueville’s conception of national interest through the lens of national honor, together with the doctrine of interest rightly understood, this article argues that his endorsement of empire demanded France to sacrifice part of its own interests. Its morality lies not primarily in the benefits conferred upon colonies, such as local liberty, but in the self-sacrifice inherent in the empire’s own interests: the sacrifice of domestic material interests for the sake of domestic spiritual interests.

How can we understand the practical dilemmas facing modern democracy, including economic inequality and the populist backlash? How can we overcome them? In recent years, Michael Sandel’s critique of neoliberalism has argued that the current wave of populism largely originates from a market-driven, meritocratic society shaped by globalization: market triumphalism has produced significant economic inequality, while meritocracy has deepened the gap between the rich and the poor, fostering elite hubris and a politics of humiliation. From the perspective of civic republicanism, he suggests promoting the common good as a way to renew democracy. From What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (2012a) to The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the Common Good? (2020), Sandel has continued his critique of liberalism. While he analyzes the market meritocracy and populism on the surface, in essence he guides civic deliberation and institutional reflection on the common good through his republicanism. In other words, Sandel advocates for a public philosophy approach, emphasizing contributive justice through the dignity of work. In contrast to studies that focus on his critiques, this article not only elaborates on how Sandel diagnoses the market meritocracy but also addresses and defends three major controversies: (1) The market debate on the neutrality of the concept of the good life; (2) What is the communal meaning of the common good in a meritocracy? (3) Is financialization an obstacle to the common good? Through this discussion, I argue that Sandel reconstructs a politics of the common good and a conception of contributive justice based on the recognition of the dignity of work, thereby advocating a form of civic republicanism that can accommodate the pluralistic contemporary society. In terms of political thought, these two works demonstrate his dual efforts—both practicing philosophy and promoting civic education in the public sphere—ultimately contributing to a political-public philosophical system uniquely his own.