This article attempts to explore Ronald Dworkin’s democracy from the perspective of constitutional liberalism. The core of Dworkin’s political philosophy is “equality”. However, is egalitarian liberalism possible in democratic life? Or what is democracy in a constitutional practice sense? In reviewing his works, I argue that Dworkin has not only developed constitutional liberalism but has also justified a theory of democracy based on a moral reading of the constitution, that is, not a majoritarian democracy but rather a constitutional democracy, or a “partnership democracy” in Dworkin’s words. Such a democracy is really a genuine democracy because there are three political ideals: “popular sovereignty,” “citizen equality,” and “democratic discourse” in partnership democracy. There are three parts to my arguments. First, in the theoretical grounds for democracy, I discuss the essentials of Dworkin’s jurisprudence and the relationships among equality, the constitution and democracy, and the two principles of human dignity as common ground in the political debate to reveal the arguments underlying Dworkin’s democratic reasoning. For Dworkin, it is a very important clue that might otherwise be ignored. Secondly, in justifying the theory of democracy, this article answers two philosophical questions in order to analyze what does Dworkin mean of partnership democracy and its characteristics: (1) Is a judicial review undemocratic? (2) Is there any conflict between constitutionalism and democracy? Finally, based on Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative democracy that criticizes Dworkin’s thought, I think that partnership democracy signifies the importance of the constitutional regime but is too utopian. In challenging Dworkin’s arguments, this article evaluates and critically reflects the whole of Dworkin’s theory of democracy.