The idea of crowdfunding has rapidly gained momentum around the world, as ordinary people have been looking for solutions to compensate for the diminishing interest rates on their investments in bonds and bank savings deposits as a result of the financial crisis in 2008-2009. The authorities have long remained inactive, but due to the rapid growth in popularity of crowdfunding, they have slowly introduced or modified regulations. The regulatory authorities have had to identify the interests of stakeholders to facilitate access to micro and small capital, as well as to create a system for platforms serving as intermediaries between fund receivers and providers, while at the same time protecting individual investors against total loss. This research seeks to find and analyze key reasons for the importance of retail funding in Singapore and South Korea as the two countries share a similar historic and economic background in the post-World War II era. It also examines whether and to what extent the regulatory framework in these two countries is patterned upon the framework created in more developed and experienced countries. It focuses on securitized, that is, equity-based and lending-based, crowdfunding and intends to analyze the development and application of crowdfunding regulations in Singapore, which opted for a modification of existing regulations, and South Korea, which opted for an explicit regulation. The study then seeks to identify the main similarities and differences between these two countries in the context of crowdfunding regulations. Finally, it endeavors to answer the question of whether crowdfunding may become a potential source of funding for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in these two countries, with a particular focus on startups devoid of the financial resources needed for growth and for the commercialization of new products and services. 

如同今日的台灣，威瑪共和也曾採行公民投票的制度並且以憲法明文規定之。按照立憲者的原意，之所以要將直接民主的要素帶入威瑪憲法，其理由主要在於他們──一如臺灣的立憲者──對於議會的不信任，因此將直接民主要素視為用以補充代議機關之不足，甚或是視為制衡議會的機制之一。德國法學者 Carl Schmitt（施密特）不僅曾經深入地分析議會制的正當性，也同樣對威瑪憲法當中的直接民主要素做出了批評：直接民主形成了對於議會制度的挑戰，並間接造成威瑪共和的瓦解。在理論層次來看，施米特對於代議民主與直接民主的觀察雖然在戰後德國被繼受，但他的影響卻常常被低估。因此，本文將對威瑪的直接民主制度進行概略性的剖析。接著則再回到理論面，透過 Carl Schmitt 的書寫來探討代議民主與直接民主的競爭關係，最後則透過其觀點來反思直接民主的侷限與缺失。